SFM

PMR: Shall we deduct that the Buddy Inspiration is a dangerous device?
BG: Objectively nothing proves it. And COMEX is not a specialist on the matter, even if we devised an emergency rebreather during Operation Hydra VIII. This “Bell Out System” gave divers an autonomy of 20 minutes at a depth of 500m versus 2 minutes with standard bottles. The device had been validated at 530m and has been commonly used between 220m and 340m in the 90s in Brazil. Today it’s not actualized (used?) anymore. That said this rebreather, like the Navy’s rebreathers, is a mechanical type when the Buddy is an electronical type with all the risks that go along. That reserve should nonetheless be alleviated with the circuits’ redundancy. Oxygen captors for example are tripled and the reliability of the Inspiration is apparently not contested… At least neither in its conception nor its build quality. One should look instead into its applications and uses…
There’s a fundamental difference between civilian professional diving and leisure/hobby diving which is not managed from the surface whereas in the first case, a 1974 law mandates this precaution. For this we use communication systems, video, Rovs… Decompression and gas reserves alike are managed from the surface. This obligation has considerably increased security for divers but it cannot apply to autonomous diving. The counter-example of coral divers, who are an exception to the 1974 law, is eloquent. Disappearances are numerous… Whereas for the military, we’ve said it, their procedures, notably the regulator strap and the obligation to dive in attached pairs, contribute to the security improvement. On the 96 mentioned accidents, there has been only 3 deaths, 2 with pure oxygen and one with trimix beyond 80m. It represents 1 death for 200,000 exposures which in purely statistical terms is really very low.